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Abstract
The introduction explains the purpose of this volume: to explain the 
development of labour relations by looking at the institutions pertaining 
to various economic resources in society: commodities, land, labour, 
and capital. Rather than looking at the effect of colonial institutions on 
economic growth and viewing labour in a static and generic manner, we 
want to establish a more precise relationship between colonial institu-
tions and changing labour relations. Therefore the pre-colonial, colonial, 
and post-colonial periods are taken into account and we carefully look 
at changes over time in the institutions and the various forms of labour 
relations that prevailed, both free and unfree. The agency of the work-
ers and their possible options to opt out of the labour system that was 
established by the colonizers are explicitly included.
Keywords: colonial institutions, labour relations, dynamism, agency, 
workers
This volume is one of the outcomes of the “Global Collaboratory on the His-
tory of Labour Relations, 1500-2000”, a project of the International Institute 
of Social History (IISH). The project aims to draw up a worldwide inventory 
* This project has been made possible by generous grants from the Gerda Henkel Stiftung in 
Düsseldorf and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientif ic Research (NWO). For more informa-
tion on the project and its background, see Hofmeester et al., “The Global Collaboratory on the 
History of Labour Relations”.
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of all types of labour relations, in all their facets and combinations, in 
different parts of the world, and at f ive points in time: 1500, 1650, 1800, 1900 
(also 1950 for Africa), and 2000. The f irst phase of this project (2007-2012) 
consisted of data mining.1 The second phase of the project sets out in search 
of explanations for shifts in labour relations, as well as for the possible 
patterns observed therein. Causes and consequences of changes in labour 
relations are explored in a series of dedicated workshops, by looking in depth 
at possible explanatory factors, such as the role of the state, demography, 
family patterns, and – the topic of this volume – economic institutions.2
In order to compare and analyse all types of work and labour relations, the 
collaboratory starts off from a very comprehensive definition of work, provided 
by the sociologists Charles and Chris Tilly: “work includes any human effort 
adding use value to goods and services”.3 In our view, labour relations define for 
or with whom one works and under what rules. Taking these definitions of work 
and labour relations as a starting point, members of the collaboratory developed 
a taxonomy of labour relations that allows for long-term global comparisons.
1 For the data, please refer to https://collab.iisg.nl/web/labourrelations/results.
2 Papers from the f irst workshop on the role of the state have been published in Hofmeester, 
Kessler, and Moll-Murata, Conquerors, Employers and Arbiters; a number of papers from the 
workshop on demography and family patterns have been published in a special section of 
History of the Family (vol. 22, no. 1).
3 Tilly and Tilly, Work under Capitalism, p. 22.
Figure 1.1  Taxonomy of Labour Relations
Starting
point
Type of
exchange
Goal of
production Labour relations (individuals) Subcategory
1:
2:
3:
Aﬄuent
Unemployed
Leading producers4a: 
Kin producers4b: 
Kin non-producers5: 
Servants6: 
Redistributive labourers7: 
Obligatory labourers8: 
Indentured tributary labourers9: 
Tributary serfs10: 
Tributary slaves11: 
Self-employed leading producers12a: 
Of free wage earners13.1: 
Of indentured labourers13.2: 
Of serfs13.3: 
Of slaves13.4: 
Sharecropping14.1: 
Piece rate14.2: 
Time rate14.3: 
Cooperative subcontracting14.4: 
Working for proprietor17.1: 
For hire17.2: 
Sharecropping18.1: 
Piece rate18.2: 
Time rate18.3: 
Self-employed kin producers12b: 
Employers13: 
Wage earners14: 
Indentured labourers15: 
Serfs16: 
Slaves17: 
Wage earners18: 
Total
population
Non-working
Reciprocal
labour
Tributary
labour
Household(s)
Polity
Market
Non-market
institutions
Commodied
labour
Cannot work or cannot be expected to work
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First, the taxonomy distinguishes between those who are able to work 
and those unable to do so. Next, in Column 2 it distinguishes between 
the three types of exchange in organizing the interchange of goods and 
services, including work. These types of exchange link up with the three 
levels of analysis listed in Column 3, which reflect the target of production: 
the household (or a community consisting of a group of households), the 
polity, or the market. There are three principles on which this exchange 
takes place. The first is reciprocity: work done for other members of the same 
household or a group of households that form a community. The second 
principle is tribute giving: work based on obligations vis-à-vis the polity. The 
third principle is market exchange, in which labour is commodified: in this 
case the worker – or in the case of unfree labour, the owner of the worker – 
sells their means of production or the products of their work. In Column 4, 
the labour relations of individuals are listed. They are based on the position 
of individuals within the entities that organize labour (households, polities, 
and markets), the degree of freedom, and the methods of remuneration.
The preliminary outcomes of this project suggest that in the long run, 
the proportion of the population engaged in commodified labour increased 
at the expense of reciprocal labour and tributary labour. Commodif ied 
labour began earlier than expected, but at the same time reciprocal labour 
lasted longer than previously assumed. This can be explained by another 
important f inding, that, from early on, many individuals and households 
pooled various types of labour relations (for example, combining commodi-
f ied labour with reciprocal labour). Shifts in labour relations are frequently 
manifested as shifts in combinations of labour relations. Within the cat-
egory of commodif ied labour, we see a change from self-employment to 
wage labour. This was not a linear development. The most recent examples 
are the many regions in the world that exhibited decreases in wage labour 
in the twenty-f irst century. What drove these developments?
In New Institutional Economics, institutions and institutional change are 
identified as crucial variables in shaping all economic relations, thus includ-
ing labour relations. Douglass North def ines institutions as “humanly de-
vised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions”.4 
These constraints may be both formal (for example, constitutions, laws, and 
property rights) and informal (for example, customs and traditions). It is the 
purpose in this volume to analyse and explain the development of labour 
relations by looking at the institutions pertaining to various economic 
resources in society: commodities, land, labour, and capital. Institutions 
4 North, “Institutions”.
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can affect the distribution of these resources across the population, which 
can in turn determine labour relations.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson are strongly 
influenced by North and the institutional approach.5 They suggest that 
those countries colonized by European powers that were relatively rich 500 
years ago, are now relatively poor – and vice versa – and argue that this 
reversal reflects an “institutional reversal” caused by the colonial powers. 
In those areas that were relatively prosperous and densely settled in 1500, or 
that were characterized by high rates of (European) settler mortality due to 
tropical diseases, the Europeans introduced (or maintained already exist-
ing) extractive institutions to profit from this wealth, whereas in poorer and 
sparsely populated areas, Europeans themselves settled in large numbers, 
and created “inclusive” institutions that safeguarded private property, 
thereby encouraging commerce and industry.6 More recently, they have 
synthesized this research in Why Nations Fail.7 Their work has been highly 
influential and has prompted economists to take more seriously the role of 
the history of institutions, especially of colonial institutions in the Global 
South.8 As a result, various economists have started testing whether the 
implementation of a specif ic institution in the past (for example, the slave 
trade, the mita, or colonial land revenue systems) had long-term conse-
quences for economic development in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.9
Nevertheless, such works have not remained without critics, and some 
have questioned the quality of the underlying data used in the analyses, 
especially the data on settler mortality and population density in the 1500 
benchmark.10 Historians have pointed out the rather a-historical approach 
taken up by these “historical” economists. Regression analyses linking a 
point in the past (1500) with outcomes expressed in terms of GDP per capita 
5 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Colonial Origins”; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son, “Reversal of Fortune”.
6 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune”, p. 1279.
7 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail.
8 See the discussion in Nunn, “The Importance of History for Economic Development”. Also 
see Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao, “How and Why Does History Matter for Development Policy?”.
9 Widely cited examples include Nunn, “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”; 
Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita”; Banerjee and Iyer, “History, Institutions 
and Economic Performance”.
10 See, e.g., Albouy, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development”; Austin, “The ‘Reversal 
of Fortune’ Thesis”. See also Easterly and Levine, “The European Origins of Economic Develop-
ment”. The authors show that the small number of European settlers indeed correlates with 
a stagnating economic growth. They do not f ind evidence, however, that this was caused by 
institutions.
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today, suffer from what Gareth Austin terms the “compression of history”.11 
Institutions were clearly not the same over this long period of time (half a 
millennium), and nor were the consequences of these institutions. In this 
volume, we follow up on such critiques and investigate the relationship 
between institutions and labour relations over time, focusing on changes 
that took place both in institutions (for example, in response to indigenous 
reactions) and in their effects as time progressed.12
In congruence with some of the other literature that has appeared over 
recent years, we believe that colonial regimes had more manifestations than 
the binary classif ication put forward by Acemoglu and colleagues. Anthony 
Hopkins, for example, notes that among historians it is currently more com-
mon to differentiate between at least three types of colonies: settlements 
(such as South Africa), concessions (such as the Belgian Congo), and trade 
colonies (such as Nigeria).13 The regimes that were introduced were not only 
determined by geography, endowments, population density, or orders from 
the metropolis, but also by pre-colonial power relations, including economic 
institutions such as rules on land distribution, property rights, and tribute 
and tax systems. In addition, the response of the indigenous and other 
population groups to the institutions that the colonizers established,14 or 
tried to establish, have to be taken into account to obtain a complete picture.
Furthermore, the works that try to show the persistent effects of colonial 
institutions primarily focus on economic growth and how to explain it. 
While labour and labour relations do play a role in these works, it is always 
described from this perspective, and often in a static and generic manner. To 
give just one important example: the availability and allocation of labour is 
generally not discussed as a variable, although a recent publication edited 
by Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara is a very welcome exception to that 
rule.15 Furthermore, it is not always clear what “extractive” institutions 
11 Austin, “The ‘Reversal of Fortune’ Thesis”.
12 Jerven, “African Growth Recurring”, focuses on periods of economic growth, explaining 
them by looking at institutions that changed over time as a consequence of African agency 
in the form of economic specialization. Labour and labour relations do not play a role in his 
argument, however.
13 Hopkins, “New Economic History”, p. 168. Ewout Frankema distinguishes four types of 
colonial states and relates them to the character of their tax levels and spending patterns. See 
his “Colonial Taxation and Government Spending in British Africa”.
14 See, for example, Bayly, “Indigenous and Colonial Origins”, on institutional changes spurred 
by indigenous elites in Colonial India in the nineteenth century. On the local elites in the Spanish 
empire, see Grafe and Irigoin, “A Stakeholder Empire”.
15 Austin and Sugihara, and the authors of the articles in their edited volume Labour-Intensive 
Industrialization in Global History, do analyse labour as a variable, discussing not only its 
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are and how these have changed due to colonial rule. A distinguishing 
feature of extractive institutions, according to Acemoglu and colleagues, is 
“a high concentration of political power in the hands of a few who extracted 
resources from the rest of the population”.16 As an example, they mention the 
silver-mining networks set up by the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers that 
were based on forced labour and oppression of the native population with 
the help of monopolized military power to extract silver.17 The contribution 
by Rossana Barragán in this volume shows, however, that the situation in the 
Potosí silver mines was far more complex – characterized by a wide range 
of labour relations and an important role for indigenous and “informal” 
institutions – and that it is was more dynamic than the description by 
Acemoglu and colleagues suggests. In this respect, the non-Eurocentric, 
more global approach to institutions (both formal and informal) as sug-
gested by Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Roy Bin Wong, seems more fruitful 
than the division between “good” inclusive institutions, more or less based 
on what was the norm in Western Europe, and “bad” extractive institutions 
that were established in other parts of the world.18
The concept of “inclusive institutions”, that is, institutions that “secure 
private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public 
services that provides a level playing f ield in which people can exchange 
and contract”19 may also benefit from further ref inement. In South Africa, 
British colonial power created inclusive institutions in the sense that there 
were constraints on executive power and secure private property rights. 
Nonetheless, despite colour-blind laws and a functioning democratic system, 
the specif ic institutions created to supply the diamond mines with labour 
were openly racist and excluded many black workers from private property 
and an opportunity to “contract”, as Karin Hofmeester shows in her chapter. 
Further, the European institutions mentioned in Matthias van Rossum’s 
chapter on maritime labour relations in Europe and Asia, enforced upon 
Asian (maritime) labour markets, can be considered “inclusive” economic 
institutions, organizing market exchange and safeguarding contractual 
agreements. These contracts, however, generally did increase inequalities 
availability and allocation (including the allocation and division of labour within the household), 
but also the quality of labour and the role of colonial and also indigenous or local and often 
very informal (among others, schooling and training) institutions that played a role in it. See 
especially p. 296 for this.
16 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune”, p. 1234.
17 Ibid., p. 1264.
18 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence.
19 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, pp. 74-75.
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in power relations, as they often favoured the claims of employers over the 
protection of the rights of labourers.
Power relations are a crucial element in both the development and the 
effects of institutions.20 In this volume, Elias C. Mandala examines power 
relations between the colonial governments and capitalist enterprises. He 
discusses how the high freight costs charged by private railroad owners in 
Malawi hindered the development of the cotton industry that the British 
colonizers so eagerly wanted to stimulate. Another example is the British 
colonial off icials in South Africa, who tried to gain mineral rights, but lost 
the battle with the internationally f inanced diamond-mining companies. In 
addition, the power relations between the colonial rulers in the metropolis 
and the colonial administrators “on the ground” in the colonies should be 
taken into account if we want to know the exact effects of colonial institu-
tions. In both Java and Cuba, the powerful sugar plantation conglomerates 
were well able to further their interests vis-à-vis those of the (semi-) colonial 
state, as Ulbe Bosma’s contribution demonstrates.
To establish a more precise relationship between colonial institutions 
and changing labour relations, we want to take the pre-colonial, colonial, 
and post-colonial periods into account and carefully look at changes over 
time in the institutions and the various forms of labour relations that 
prevailed, both unfree and free. We want to examine the agency of the 
workers and their possible options to combine labour relations to at least 
partially opt out of the labour system the colonizers established. Various 
contributions in this volume therefore also deal with the role of migratory 
labour and household labour strategies, including the work carried out by 
women and children.
It is our intuition that colonial rule, which originated from the European 
quest for exotic commodities, f irst and foremost manifested itself in the 
systems of production and trade of global commodities. Therefore the f irst, 
and largest, section of this volume is devoted to institutions related to com-
modity production and trade. Scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein and 
Andre Gunder Frank have argued that between 1500 and 1900, global trade 
resulted in a specific pattern of intercontinental specialization: whereas the 
periphery concentrated on the production of primary goods, the European 
core could shift part of its production into more productive sectors of the 
20 See also Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; North, 
Summerhill, and Weingast, “Order, Disorder and Economic Change”; North, Wallis, and Weingast, 
Violence and Social Orders. For a specif ic focus on labour, see Cooper, Decolonization and African 
Society.
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economy, such as manufacturing.21 More recently, Jeffrey Williamson argued 
that the favourable terms of trade for cash crops led to deindustrialization 
in the “poor periphery”.22 As these economies focused on the export of only 
a few cash crops, they also became more vulnerable to price volatility.
In his contribution, William Clarence-Smith takes issue with these narra-
tives. He emphasizes that industries in the “Global South” in the nineteenth 
century were much more developed than one might think when starting 
off from deindustrialization and dependency theories. He stresses that 
in addition to the role of import-substitution of consumer goods, export 
substitution, artisanal production (including producing under putting-out, 
sharecropping, and other more complex forms of labour relations), and 
the processing of “primary goods” were important in the development of 
industries in the developing world. The latter development could lead to 
more wage labour, though other forms of (unfree) labour were also applied. 
His chapter convincingly shows that (colonial) economic institutions during 
the free trade period (the 1850s to 1914) stimulated the development of 
industries in the developing world, whereas the institutions developed 
during the period of protection (1914 to the 1950s) had severely hindering 
effects, especially on export substitution.
In his contribution concerning cotton agriculture in Malawi, Mandala 
shows that although the British wanted to introduce commercial agriculture 
based on European capital and African wage labour, the high producer costs, 
low cotton prices, and resistance of rural Africans to wage labour, led to the 
failure of capitalist agriculture. Instead, cotton production came to be based 
on unpaid family labour on peasant smallholdings. Malawian peasants 
responded to economic realities and British demands for cotton by integrat-
ing cotton cultivation within their existing systems of food production as 
well as other economic activities, often combining several types of labour 
relations. Mandala furthermore shows that despite the general failure of 
cotton agriculture, which had negative effects for the wider economy, there 
were few substantive differences between the British colonial policies and 
institutions and those of the post-colonial governments (which continued 
to pay low prices to producers and extracted the surpluses, as they sold the 
cotton for a higher price on the world market).
The production of specif ic global commodities has been associated with 
specif ic modes of production. In a famous contribution, Stanley Enger-
man and Kenneth Sokoloff associate the production of sugar, tobacco, and 
21 Wallerstein, The Modern World System; Gunder Frank, World Accumulation.
22 Williamson, Trade and Poverty.
IntRoduC tIon 19
cotton with large-scale production on plantations using slave labour.23 
As ever-increasing quantities of sugar, coffee, cotton, and other products, 
in various stages of production, were being transported across the globe, 
labour relations changed. However, the organization of production (and thus 
the associated labour relations) might not only differ between commodities 
(some raw materials have to be processed into manufactured goods before 
they can be transported, others not). The organization of production of one 
particular product – as Ulbe Bosma shows in his contribution about sugar 
and Karin Hofmeester indicates in her chapter about diamonds – could also 
differ between areas, depending on the scale of production and the method 
of f inancing the operations. What the contribution by Clarence-Smith 
shows, is that some of the export processing industries in the Global South 
disappeared because of protective institutions (such as tariffs and import 
restrictions) developed by the colonial powers to protect labour in the 
metropolis. This same protection of labour in the metropolis could lead to 
worsening labour conditions and labour relations for maritime labour in 
Asia, as Matthias van Rossum discusses. Thus, changes in colonial economic 
institutions could lead to shifts in labour relations, both in the colonies and 
at home. As Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk illustrates, the introduction of 
the Cultivation System (in Dutch: cultuurstelsel) in the Netherlands Indies 
altered institutions such as property rights, which not only affected labour 
relations in the colonies, but also led to changing labour relations in the 
Netherlands.
In addition, various studies have emphasized indigenous reactions to the 
implementation of colonial institutions.24 Following up on this, the current 
volume also takes into account the agency of different population groups 
as they responded to changing colonial institutions. In some cases, local 
institutions could not be replaced or controlled by colonial institutions, 
such as land property rights, the bazaar, and the role of the middlemen in 
India, as discussed in the contribution by Bosma. The resistance of African 
farmers to engage in wage labour hindered the rise of a capitalist cotton-
farming sector in Malawi, as mentioned above. The same resistance against 
(often unfree) forms of wage labour can be found in various other African 
23 Engerman and Sokoloff, “History Lessons”.
24 See, for example, Bayly, “Indigenous and Colonial Origins”; Hopkins, “New Economic His-
tory”, p. 170, and Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. The latter focuses on labour and 
responses to colonial and post-colonial institutions. More recently, Ewout Frankema, Erik Green, 
and Ellen Hillbom have shown that the actions indigenous people undertook determined to 
a large extent the institutions established by colonial governments. See their “Endogenous 
Processes of Colonial Settlement”.
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countries, such as the Belgian Congo. The alternative of subsistence or inde-
pendent commercial farming played an important role in the reluctance of 
Africans to take up wage labour in the Belgian mines and plantations. With 
the introduction of forced cultivation and the destruction of local markets, 
this alternative disappeared. As the information on the Netherlands Indies 
in the contribution by Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk shows, this was less 
the case under the Cultivation System.25 Apart from resisting wage work, 
there are also examples of workers running off and starting out for them-
selves, such as the slaves in the Brazilian diamond mines as discussed by 
Hofmeester. Various contributions discuss the importance of (seasonal) 
migration. Yet another indigenous response that can be identif ied is the 
rearranging of household strategies. If we take the agency of the indigenous 
population seriously, we should include the whole population and thus also 
look at gendered responses to colonial institutions. The chapter by Van 
Nederveen Meerkerk shows that the “extractive institution” embodied by 
the Cultivation System initially caused a shift among a large group of Java-
nese women from working for the market to subsistence labour. However, 
the later reawakening of the textile industry was based on their return to 
producing textiles for the market. Van Nederveen Meerkerk’s contribution 
makes a case against the deindustrialization thesis. In addition, both her 
contribution and that of Clarence-Smith stress the importance of local 
consumption for commodity production (and thus labour relations) in the 
overseas areas.
Access to land and labour is of course vital to commodity production, and 
as such it is dealt with in the f irst part of this volume, which is therefore the 
largest. In a provocative recent publication, Bas van Bavel suggests f irst of all 
that markets for land, labour, and capital have existed since antiquity, and 
are thus not a modern phenomenon as often thought. However, he admits 
that in some parts of the world, markets for land and labour remained weak 
up to the nineteenth century.26 In many of these areas, colonial powers 
thus played an important role in introducing such markets and altering the 
previous systems for allocating labour and land. One of his main points is 
that the rise of markets for land and labour is, in the long run, associated 
with greater discrepancies in wealth and power.27 Colonial elites often 
25 See Houben and Seibert, “(Un)freedom”. For the consequences of later institutional changes 
in the Netherlands Indies and Belgian Congo and their effects among others on (forced) labour, 
see Booth, “Varieties of Exploitation”.
26 Van Bavel, The Invisible Hand?, p. 14.
27 Ibid., p. 21.
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brought in, or maintained, coercive elements in markets, which further 
spurred trends towards more inequality, especially between different ethnic 
groups. Various contributions to this volume also hint at such dynamics (for 
example, Van Rossum and Hofmeester).
The second part of the volume is specif ically dedicated to the land and 
labour market institutions established by the colonizers in order to produce 
the commodities they needed, including cash and food crops. To start with 
the labour market institutions: the mita is an example of an institution to 
allocate unfree labour (see Barragán’s contribution), in the same way as 
labour recruitment institutions that consciously established segmented 
labour markets, which is the subject of the contribution by Van Rossum 
and is also dealt with in the chapter by Hofmeester where she discusses 
diamond mines in South Africa. At the same time, a labour market for free 
wage labour existed in Potosí and aboard the ships in the Asian maritime 
trade, and various chapters seem to point in the direction of combined 
labour relations (for example, Barragán, Mandala, and Karin Pallaver). If 
pre-colonial land property rights of the small-scale peasantry were secured 
during colonial times, subsistence farming was frequently a way out for 
workers to escape from forced labour: by migrating back to their small plots 
of land, workers could escape the system of unfree labour in the mines. 
Another important element that Barragán puts forward is that the mita 
changed over time, which contains a clear warning against a static view of 
the functioning of economic institutions.
The abolition of the slave trade provides a very clear example of changing 
colonial labour market institutions. What happened to labour relations after 
this most coercive form – often not established by, but massively expanded 
by colonial powers and their institutions – had to give way? This is the 
subject of the contribution by Johan Fourie and Erik Green. They compare 
the input of slave and local Khoesan labour (often in apprenticeship form 
but also in working gangs) on pastoral farms in the interior of the Cape 
Colony after a ban was introduced on the import of slaves. At f irst, a shift 
of slave labour from the west to the east of the Cape Colony took place and 
an increase of slave labour went hand in hand with a decrease of Khoesan 
labour in the farms in the interior. After the ban on the import of slaves 
of 1807, and the 1809 colonial labour code that restricted Khoesan labour 
mobility and enabled farmers to tie the children of Khoesan labourers to 
their farm for unpaid labour, a form of semi-bonded labour, the authors note 
a decrease of slave productivity and an increase of Khoesan (bonded) labour.
The f inal part of the volume contains two examinations of the effects of 
monetization and taxation on labour relations. To date, few scholars have 
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connected the study of numismatics with the study of labour relations. In 
this volume, we bring together two prominent experts in this f ield and we 
hope that these stimulating contributions will spur further study at this 
intersection. Colonial powers often introduced currencies and tried to 
“extract” money via taxation. It was also hoped that imposing taxes, which 
required the local population to have cash, would increase the availability 
of wage labour (also discussed in the contribution by Mandala). All of 
this led to increased commercialization, the commodif ication of labour, 
and the monetization of the colonial economies. As a side effect, the local 
population sometimes entered into wage labour relations to be able to buy 
products that became available because of the colonial presence. Pallaver, 
however, suggests that taxation was not always a very effective way to raise 
the number of permanent wage labourers in the East African Protectorate 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as one month of wage 
work or the sale of a small amount of livestock suff iced to pay the annual 
hut tax. Finding enough wage labourers remained problematic in the colony 
until the latter half of the 1920s, when economic crises, growing population 
pressure in the reserves, and a growing African taste for consumer imports, 
ensured an adequate f low of labourers without further coercion by the 
colonial state. There were two types of coins that were used to pay for wage 
labour, the large denominations of silver rupees (“the coercive currency of 
taxes”) and the smaller copper cents. Rupees were paid to those permanent 
labourers who needed colonial money to pay the tax or to buy cattle to 
provide a bridewealth. These were workers who were unable to increase 
their agricultural production or sell cattle in order to obtain the money 
needed for tax payments. However, for everyday needs, it was suff icient to 
work for only a few days and to obtain cents. These were then used in the 
local markets. Women, who worked for wages only for very short periods, 
were instrumental in favouring the circulation of cent coins, as were casual 
labourers. The circulation in cents says something about women’s wage 
labour. Pallaver’s contribution clearly shows the direct relationship between 
labour relations and the circulation of coins of specif ic denominations.
Jan Lucassen works on the same theme in his contribution and f inds that 
the degree of monetization in societies is a good proxy for the prevalence of 
wage labour. On the basis of estimates of the amount of small denomination 
currencies in circulation per capita, he derives levels of monetization for 
Europe and Asia in the second millennium and f inds that India and Europe 
generally had similar levels of monetization between 1000 and 1900, but that 
China had generally (much) higher levels. Furthermore, he shows that Europe 
and India show roughly similar trends in the degree of monetization over 
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this period, whereas trends in China exhibit different movements. Although 
these developments in monetization in part depend on the availability of 
institutions supplying (small) credit to workers, Lucassen argues that there 
is a strong relationship with shifts in labour relations: rises in monetization 
coincide with shifts from unfree to free labour, and from reciprocal to com-
modif ied labour. Lastly, he provides examples where workers demanded 
payment in specif ic types of coins, again demonstrating the agency and 
responses of local workers to institutions and institutional changes.
In sum, inspired by the path-breaking works of North and Acemoglu 
and colleagues, this collection of writings tries to explain shifts in labour 
relations by focusing on the effects of colonial institutions. In all the 
contributions, it becomes clear that colonial institutions played a major 
role in the persistence or change of certain labour relations. However, the 
precise manner in which these institutions were implemented and the 
channels through which they affected labour relations were dependent on 
local contexts and more complex than one would expect on the basis of a 
binary model of inclusive versus extractive institutions. Colonial powers 
were often not in a position to simply introduce institutions as they saw f it: 
they were not able to easily change pre-colonial institutions, but instead 
took over those institutions and made adaptations. The implementation of 
institutions by colonial governments was often contested by local popula-
tions, but also by the power of international capitalists. In terms of changes 
in labour relations, the implementation or adaption of institutions did not 
always lead to the shifts anticipated or wished for by colonial governments. 
Nor did colonial governments in the overseas territories simply execute 
policies or implement institutions as they were set out by governments in 
the metropolis. Local colonial off icials also did not always carry out orders 
from the metropolis, suggesting that power relations played an important 
role in the actual functioning of institutions at various administrative levels. 
It is important that the local population often reacted to the colonial policies 
and institutions by combining labour relations. Furthermore, the afore-
mentioned nuances and complications also blur the distinction between 
extractive and inclusive institutions. If one zooms in closer on the effects 
for different types of workers, the effects of what in principle may be seen 
as inclusive institutions were in practice quite extractive and vice versa. 
In emphasizing these complicated interactions between institutions and 
labour relations, this volume hopes to contribute to the wider literature on 
the effects of colonial institutions on development and the role of labour 
and labour relations in this, as well as to our understanding of the factors 
influencing changes in labour relations from the f ifteenth century onward.
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